1. Introduction
The vehicle of delivery of development has not shown the desired impact. The public sector delivery of services has created much dissatisfaction. It has created issues like pervading poverty (1) and the failure of government departments to come up with the answers to management of assets. The operations and maintenance of rural water supply schemes has ended up with a yawning gap of about Rs.500 million in the revenues and expenditures annually. (2) The failure of primary schools, a simple facility for a simple task to function where near satisfaction and the BHUs to provide the most basic of health facilities is a discouraging feat for the government. (3) However, it does not call for abandoning everything and going back to woods. The situation is not incomprehensible and on analysis provides very clear reasons for the failure. Fortunately, most of the identified reasons are amenable to actions. Therefore, the need for an incomprehensible solution does not arise. One of the options presented for rural development is the RSP approach. The following paragraphs are an endeavour to evaluate the Rural Support Programme (RSP) approach as a panacea for the failure of the public sector in rural development.
2. RSP, NGO or the Government-the varied pursuits of public interest
The pursuit of general public good is shared by the government, NGOs and RSPs in their various areas of focus of attention. The government has the mandatory obligation to act in the public interest while the NGO can work for its convictions. Hence the latter's allegiance to its convictions and actions in its pursuance are completely legitimate and valid but the same course of action for public policy and the government cannot be tenable. Every conviction how so much altruistic has, in addition to altruism, to he examined at the altar of a defined public interest in a government's working. This definition comes through the nature of governance in a society but would invariably be subject to outcomes of formal procedures and institutional arrangements in a modern state. The RSPs on the other hand share a luxury of choice with the NGOs.
3. Understanding an RSP
The RSPs have been mostly created with public funds for working in rural development as NGOs. (4) A number of such programmes are working in the area of rural development. They have a central office and a Board of Directors. The Board has members from the government as well. The operations are launched in various rural areas which, most often than not, would not be contiguous to the central offices in the large urban centres. (5)The operations comprise of formation of community organisations, redressing the ills of failing government agencies like agriculture extension, livestock extension and forestry through holding joint meetings of the community members with officials of these agencies, training programmes in skills like animal husbandry, poultry extension and similar others, encouraging savings, development of micro-infrastructure-and lending micro-credit.
(6)The approach argues for an agent to provide social guidance to the rural poor and exist over long-term amidst them for the purpose.(7) The RSPs have been working as agents for delivery of such services in various government programmes and have been receiving funds from donors for independent projects as well. In some cases the work has been funded from the interest earned on endowment funds while credit lines from public owned financial institutions have been negotiated.
The non-governmental character allows the RSPs to function in a flexible manner and allows them to respond to the intricately differing local needs of the communities. More importantly it gives them an image of not sharing the baggage of failure with the Government. The distinction becomes important when the government is judged with the principle of half empty glass and RSP, in the same breath, is evaluated for whatever proportion is filled.
The failure of one is in reaching only 80% of the households while the success of the other would be in reaching 1 5%. In certain cases even when the members of community organisations are less than twenty thousand after half a decade in a population of more than a million the district is declared to be covered. (8)
The state will always remain answerable for its failure in delivery of services and development. Therefore, the RSPs' presentation of themselves as distinct from the government in the rural populations allows them to start from a positive image. This is an important gain for them in working with communities. In fact, the continued criticism of the government agencies gives them the opportunity to don the attire of a friend of the people, which on their behalf intercedes with the government. As a bye-product of this activity the government looses and its image of anti-people stance gets solidified through its obliging in delivery of services and development through another agent rather than through working with the people directly.
Despite these gains at times the RSPs have a strange desire to assert as different from NGOs or as quasi-government agencies.(9) To some extent, at least it is for the resuscitation of the umbilical link. The need for funds is best fulfilled through accessing the public coffers.(10) Most of the operational expenditures are met out of public endowments or project finances.(11) The availability of credit lines from the public owned financial institutions can help the lending programmes. The membership of the government persons on the Boards also allows them to have a too close for comfort relationship with the government.
This is per se an arrangement which grows feathers of two different hues. A worrisome fact is that the attempt to acquire the best of the characteristics of both the worlds can lead to ending up with the weak areas of the two different natured organisations. The RSPs therefore can come under the yoke of central offices with dogmatic approaches to development, lobbying for decisions and reliving the patron-client relationships with the communities which precisely were some of the attributes they had generally set out to eradicate from the erstwhile governmental development policy and practice. The requirement of a permanent support organization for sustaining the community-based organisations can be a euphemistic description of the latter bete noir of development.(12)
4. The Need, As presented, of an RSP
The need for an RSP is presented as an intermediary, which can plead on behalf of the people with the government and provide social guidance to the people at the same time. Since these are areas which can always be argued to require action the RSPs are also agents which will be required over long-term. These are very valid objectives, which only differ from the political parties in that the RSPs do not have to be accountable at the hustings. Moreover, the sway that an RSP can have on governmental decision-making can transcend changes in political administration and therefore laugh iii the face of the process of natural selection that helps bring in the best in political systems.
5. The Raison D'etre OF NGOs
The government agencies are formal organisations that are created to provide specific e services to the society. Due to the needs to cater for transparency and equity their selection procedures are stiff and give precedence to providing equal opportunity to citizens for employment more than any other objectives. The process of these agencies also gets defined to the last details which the civil servants have to follow to allow for accountable and rule based decision making.
This is a tough prescription. The NGOs on the other hand can avoid stiff selection criteria and rule bound decision making arid respond to the situations in flexible manner. Their decision-making levels are nearer to the beneficiaries and therefore can respond to the situations in a better manner. The government agencies on the other hand act in a centralized manner and therefore provide responses, which are rigid, and inadequate. Therefore even when delivery of many services is classed as public goods the areas of failure of delivery are the places of choice for NGO presence and activity. NGOs are recognized. as important actors in various fields. (13)
6. An Analysis of Advantages of RSP If it Is Not An NGO
The question, which remains to be answered, is to what extent can the RSP fulfill many of these roles and provide the same attributes. The large structures and the agenda of reaching every village will require more mechanisms for linkages with central offices. If the claims of covering districts and provinces have to be seriously considered to mean providing services to a predominant proportion of population then the establishment will need to grow. The RSP in such a situation will lose the advantages of NGOs.
Their centralized decision making of providing services will effect the flexibility for provision of services. The decentralisation with the apparent creation of regional offices can be as good a decentralisation as in the government organisations with the district and tehsil offices, but through exercise of control over the heads of peripheral offices a centralized working environment comes into being. In fact, the other alternative of having totally delinked regional offices and structures will be based on putting the faith in the altruism of these offices and holding them accountable only on the basis of their self-generated reports. In effect, it would only hold regional heads accountable to publishing substandard periodic reports which will mostly form the basis of evaluations and in most cases might substitute independent evaluations.
7. Limited Utility of RSP as a Choice in Poverty Eradication and Rural Development
The RSPs have demonstrated the formation of community organisations. In this pursuit, the people are encouraged to get together and assent to form an identifiable entity. The organisations are given an incentive in the form of micro-credit or micro-infrastructure project according to their identified need. The success of RSPs remains concentrated in this sub-area of rural development even when the depth of the impact requires further discussion (vide infra). It helps to supplement the state's efforts in delivery of services of this nature. But if the ambit of state's development initiatives goes beyond micro-infrastructure and micro-credit then the vehicle of delivery becomes of limited utility. Sometimes efforts of forming organisations have met rough waters as in case of Agriculture Development Component of Swabi SCARP.(14)
The immediate incentives for formation of water users associations were lacking while associations of farmers were to be created for managing irrigation watercourses. It was only after introduction of micro-credit into the process that the aim of forming the organisations could be pursued with some encouraging results. The management of BHUs (15)and schools do not have enough mobilisation incentive for the communities to work as foci of organisation in perpetuity. Rational human individuals would on average find pursuit of personal gains and community service at different indifference curves. However, this would be subject to the assumption that the latter is not coupled with a good salary.
8. Supplementing State Effort through Mobilising Additional Funds
The RSPs have been unable in most cases to mobilise additional funds, which can supplement the state's scarce resources for development. The funds of the donor assisted projects and those coming from the public exchequer can hardly be counted as additional resources. They are substituting c6rtain activities and agencies with the RSPs.(16) The savings that are mobilised locally and remain in the pool of the community organisations are also of limited amount and can not be taken to be sufficient for the development needs of the locales in the rural areas. The under emphasis of the requirement of sizeable resources to be invested in the rural areas would be a cruel and perverse result of the rural communities forming organisations and undertaking savings. Therefore, the effort in this arena will remain limited in terms of resource generation. Although the value of local resources mobilised for development will be important to generate ownership the process of development should continue with investment of resources from outside into local areas and achieve the aims of income redistribution through public sector delivery.
9. RSP As Another Government Department Albeit Having Autonomy And Flexibility
In effect if an organisation becomes dependent on public funds in perpetuity it remains a government agency in financial terms. This has certain connotations, which can be viewed in three ways. Firstly, where an endowment is created from public fund for an RSP the opportunity cost of the funds will need to be taken into consideration. The investment of a billion rupees in rural roads with a high multiplier can yield much more valuable returns compared with an endowment of the same amount that is used for administrative costs of an organisation. Secondly, even where the RSPs are supported for provision of funds by the donors or government grants are made over they offset potential public sector investments.
Thirdly, if the RSPs are dependent on public funds in perpetuity then their formation is akin to creation of an additional department of the government in the districts and at the provincial level. However it will have important distinguishing features. The RSPs will have autonomy and the civil service rules will not apply. The salary structure will be better and the incentive regime will be different than that for the employees of the government agencies. Therefore the better-motivated staff of RSP can impress upon the low paid and uninspired staff of the government agencies to work better and thus build linkages with government agencies.(17) Since the real issue and causes of the low performance of the latter will not be addressed directly this additional department of the government will have the continuous and perpetual justification of attending to the ills of earlier departments.
Another distinguishing feature would be that the public accountability mechanisms are not applicable to the RSPs. The government agencies are subject to formal accountability mechanisms, unlike an NGO or an RSP, requiring more than altruism and demonstrated sincerity of individuals. In fact, altruism has certain limitations in public policy (18) compared with well functioning systems. Therefore government agencies work under rules and procedures which constitute the systems to come up to the requirements of accountability for use of public funds. It can be argued that the accountability mechanisms in the government have not been operating.(19) However, this non-operation requires solutions which comprise of the accountability mechanisms operating without fail. The failure cannot be made into an argument for abolition of accountability mechanisms or substitution by institutional arrangements which do not have accountability mechanisms but have the guarantee of individuals' altruism and integrity.
10. The imperative Of Reforming The Departments Of The State
As an alternative it might be considered that the reform of the government agencies might be a worthwhile pursuit. The government performance can he improved through an improved incentive regime, a flexible hire and fire which is performance based. The quality of humanity in one organisational set up is not necessarily worse or better than the other. It is the incentive regime that any organisational set up offers which evokes the desired and undesired responses in employees. State itself can be reformed and rendered responsive with enhanced participation through well-planned measures including decentralisation.(20) In fact, reform of governance is mandatory for improving human well being.(21) Hence it would be logical to repair and properly fit the wheels of the cart if it is not moving with the desired pace for an additional good wheel might not solve the problem.
11. Constraints Hi Scaling Up-A Road To Nowhere.
The constraints in the utility of RSP have another aspect to them. A solution and a panacea have to be differentiated. A solution will have applicability and relevance to a certain situation. To this extent, it would have acceptance and should be applied. The presentation of a solution, which is situation specific as a panacea creates distortions for it, and might result in misallocation of resources.
The RSPs have utility in creating community based organisations which can be used as social collateral in lending in micro-credit or for ensuring better implementation in micro-infrastructure projects. If they are proffered and taken as ubiquitous vehicles of development initiatives it adds distortions to their role. Development policy and practice have to grapple with a primary issue of resource distribution within any system of governance. It has been argued that the RSP approach can provide a solution to this intractable issue which has remained on the textbooks of political science for ages.
It is argued that the community organisations created through RSPs can he linked up to formal decision making institutions of the state.(22) They can be linked up to provincial government departments if they work in a centralised arrangement.(23) Linkages can be developed with local government agencies if decentralisation is preferred. In certain scenarios in which a puritanical mobilisation is favoured they are argued to form their own federating bodies with lower echelons providing representation to higher echelons.(24) Hence it seemingly can fit to the taste of every shade of opinion.
The arrangement seems to be the dream of a salesman but can be a nightmare for a policy maker for obvious reasons. In the first case, the linkages do not resolve the problem which are a creation of centralisation. Therefore, even when satisfying cosmetic achievement can he demonstrated in the form of the line agencies personnel attending the meetings of the community organisations the issue of responsiveness in service delivery cannot he answered. In its linkages with the local governments the situation does not become very comprehensible.
The purpose of decentralisation is to bring the state institutions within the reach of electoral accountability of the citizens. If the system is designed to function in an optimal manner which ensures participation, individual citizens and their formal and informal groups would automatically start wielding influence in decision making. However, the formal institutions of the local government provide them with the structures for interest articulation and resolution. This is certainly an advancement from the coverage governance iii which groups of people vied for influence and interest articulation with informal groupings. In fact the local governments created through secret ballot also need to be taken as an improved system of participation over the one which has functioned as interest articulation in gatherings in open spaces and supported prevention of structural change in social set ups due to avid pressures on individuals.
The third scenario is the most debilitating spectacle. It has the potential of subverting the empowerment of people which modern state can offer to them. It is only in the properly functioning modern state with its institutions that people become empowered with a perceptible historic change. The federations of COs will be increasingly unrepresentative of the communities, whose name they would bear, as the tier would climb higher. The community-based organisations themselves may not be purely representative and the federations would have no compulsion of sensitivity to the interests of every group and individual down below for them unless a formal removal mechanism is enshrined.
Even when such a mechanism is enshrined, its operation in an atmosphere of freedom from coercion would only be possible in a society of egalitarian and self-restrained social structures. It would be apt to argue that the absence of this precondition would not guarantee any meaningful participation to the poor; in fact it would not guarantee it to any one but the strongest. Hence, the participation of individuals through such federations would remain short of a satisfactory interest articulation. Any thing other than an election based on secret ballot would be a fossilised form of participation. The citizens in the bargain will loose out to the elites or other dominating interests and thus forestall the slow but surer structural social change that occurs through secret ballot.
The strength of a system can only be demonstrated when it holds out to pressures generated in the political process of resource distribution. The formal institutions of local government can provide an avenue for such interest articulation and dispute resolution, which the informal institutions can not Provide with the same level of satisfaction. Even if the system of community organisations and their federations is brought into being it will be an attempt to reinvent the wheel of state structures and government. The distinguishing feature of the reinvention will however be an achievement in the form of a square wheel preventing a smooth journey.
12. Limitations Compared with a Local Government System
The local government has the advantage of providing formal and rule based organisations for interest articulation and decision-making. The resolution of differences is infinitely superior to the one that would work through informal organisations and groups, and would be much more susceptible to interest group domination and manipulation. Understandably, the march of civilisation in its development has cast the latter aside and the modern state institutions for resource allocation, through their political processes, have come into being.(25) The perverse performance of these institutions of the state, including that of local government, is not a sufficient reason for their total eclipse. It is only emphasises the importance of seeking solutions for improving their performance through reform.
13. Attributes of a Policy Option applied to RSP approach
An RSP can have the legitimate option of focusing on a narrow area of rural development as an NGO. At the same time the policy for rural development will need to have certain attributes for the government to adopt. Any public policy option. which seeks to address such wide-ranging an issue as poverty, needs to have certain attributes for its applicability. Therefore poverty reduction policy of the government will need to be comprehensive, (26) inclusive of all areas and practicable in view .of the available resources. For adoption of an approach as a government policy therefore certain aspects will be introduced into the examination of the issues here. The RSP approach can have validity backed by altruism as long as it remains an NGO initiative. However, the government's adoption of RSP approach will require it to be measured on the criterion for other public policy choices in the area of rural development. The first attribute for poverty reduction would he that of a comprehensive policy response.(27)
This will bring in the discussion of the nature of poverty and analysis of measures for addressing it. In fact, the study would require continuous research and evolution of responses for addressing the issue. The eradication of poverty through universal social mobilisation would hark back to the call in the Manifesto of 1848. The restrained solution can be in increasing economic growth, sharing its benefits and targeting investments for the poor This simplistic response can then be developed further to arrive at sets of actions required for eradication of poverty which would include preferred choices in macroeconomic policy, reform of governance, social security nets and targeted programmes for poor. Even the simplistic response would be stimulating action in the right direction. Thus a comprehensive policy response would be the choice for the government to address the multidimensional issue of poverty. (28) RSP cannot substitute such a response because of its narrow focus where the meaning of governance is equated with community organisation.(29) Au argument for its fitting into a comprehensive policy response can be made out. However the limited validity of such an argument has been discussed in earlier part of the paper.
The second attribute of applicability and application to all areas can also be used as another criterion. The RSPs application to all the districts of NWFP will require a mammoth of resources and sustenance in perpetuity even if with passage of time and success the aim of eradication of absolute poverty is succeeded by addressing relative poverty in public policy. Hence, the earlier discussion of creation of an additional quasi-government agency with its attendant merits and demerits will be relevant here. The provision of resources for a satiating application to cover every nook and corner of the Province will generate the need for resource creation by squeezing other activities.
This aspect is germane to the application of the third attribute of practicability of the policy response in view of available resources. Even if resources are provided to RSPs, additional resources will be required for the initiatives which directly effect poverty and which the RSPs can support. The buoyancy in the Province's revenues has been coupled with decrease in fiscal transfers from Federal Government(30) and therefore resource allocation for RSP approach can use up fiscal space and have a high opportunity cost. NWFP has a population of around 18 million out of which 14.6 million live in rural areas according to the provisional results of the 1998 Population Census.(31) Unfortunately poverty reduction targeting can not be oblivious to costs: it can not be safely argued that the marginal benefits in a spreading of RSP operations to cover the whole breadth of rural areas in the Province would outwit the marginal costs.(32)
14. The Validity of RSP -The Context And Limitation
The validity of RSP approach can be found in its original context namely in its functioning as an NGO in areas of its choice, The government can support the effort in facilitating removal of hurdles and any other administrative manner. The provision of large grants from public exchequer will need to be seen in the context of severe resource constraints in government's own efforts in development of rural infrastructure and delivery of services. One of the most constraining factors in state's policy implementation is resource deficiency which prevents hiring of appropriate expertise and making of sizeable investments for development.(33) Any provision of resources from public exchequer will cause further displacement in the meaningful government programmes. The national public sector investment has shrivelled from 12.3% of the GDP in 1969-70 to 3.1% in l998-99.(34)
The RSP when treated as an NGO will have the expertise for eliciting support for public sector programmes built around community participation. The utilisation of RSP for such project components may remain an option for implementation. However, it can be reasoned that state can be the only tolerable monopoly (some might argue even against that assertion).
The existence of RSPs as monopolies in the delivery of certain services cannot lead to efficient solutions. It prevents further creation of options at best and creates the potential of monopoly rents at the worst. To avoid the situation from such an eventuality the need is for creation of competition in the market of such services. The government in the interest of creating competition should mandatarily enshrine competitive bidding in all such contracts. To attain transparency in project design consultations should afford equal opportunity to all NGOs. Even in disbursing micro-credit through NGOs and RSPs creation of market competition will produce better results. (35)
Another aspect of the validity of an RSP would be related to its geographic expanse. In working as an NGO it would be accountable to the beneficiaries if it operates locally. However if there is an ever increasing urge for geographic expanse with thinning out of operations the requirement of funds would always keep rising. When the performance is referred to as covering a number of districts it does not amount to an actual satiation of these areas and therefore the logic for move into new vistas. Mostly NGOs would only move into new areas if the job in the existing ones had been accomplished to some extent.
15. Some Assessment Issues-Anecdotal Evidence Versus Empirical Assessment
The real benefit of the RSP approach can be assessed through impact evaluation. Even if no credible baselines are available rigorous methodology can sift through for impact gauging. Some other areas where the RSP model has not been applied in the Province should be studied as controls. This will allow ruling out of impact of macro-economic changes. Another difficulty comes in the form of ruling out the impact of government programmes in the RSP areas. The government programmes and private sector initiatives in the districts also have an impact on poverty and ruling out such impact will also be required for assessing the result of RSP approach. These aspects of assessment are not catered for in the common mode of presentations of the successes of the working of RSPs which rely heavily on anecdotal evidence.(36)
16. The Powerful Impact Of Anecdotal Evidence
The anecdotal evidence has the powerful impact of producing moving images for decision makers. The need for such anecdotal evidence in impressing upon the need for real and substantive action of poverty alleviation cannot be ignored. However, the utility becomes perverse when the anecdotal evidence over powers the need for a comprehensive analysis and creates the compulsion of a single solution. in fact tile presence of positive anecdotal evidence does not preclude the possibility of equally important negative anecdotal evidence. Therefore reliance for assessment of an approach on the basis of anecdotal evidence produced with the choice of a proponent can not be argued to be totally innocuous for decision making. It certainly would be worthwhile to institute properly designed independent evaluations.
17. Assumptions Underlying RSPs
The RSP approach seems to make the following assumptions:
" Government cannot be reformed
" Unlimited resources are available and no distribution choices are required
" The people are socially unmobilised
" A receiving mechanism is required in the people and therefore efforts are required for its creation; otherwise people will not have the capacity to access services
The first two assumptions can not be argued to be valid. There is considerable literature on the reform possibilities of state.(37) The scarcity of resources also has considerable validation for the national as well as provincial scenarios and does not beggar description here.(38)
The analysis of the third and fourth is also essential to the argument being presented, here. People live in communities and are part of the socially developed species of human beings. Their lives are interwoven with complex relationships and ethos. Therefore they cannot be equated with populations of other species as they occur in the wild. In fact the communities as they exist in villages operate as mobilised entities. Where there is a need for affirmative collective action communities work as organisations.
It can be construction and maintenance of a mosque, restoration of a small bridge after flood etc. However the organised community behaves rationally and does not act as an organisation when the need is not there. It retains the potential and allows and accepts the individualistic behaviour of its members. Therefore, the RSPs are recognising these organisations which exist in nature. The additional step that RSPs take is of formalising these organisations. This has the advantage of making them recognisable for provision of micro-credit and institutions of social collateral. Thus, a useful purpose is achieved. However, beyond that the community organisations function as they do in nature. In fact, the RSPs present numbers of community organisations as indicators of success.(39)
The quantum of participation that they provide to people, the proportions of the communities that take part in the process as well as the relative participation of individual members of communities in decision making are all probably assumed to he optimal. The presentation of numbers as achievements is apparently an anachronism in the process approach on which the RSP methodology is based. They fade away when the need for collective action is not there and individuals pursue their more powerful interests.
The sustainability of organisations after removal of the promise of further incentive and beyond the focus of immediate pursuit provided through the RSP remains an end that has eluded achievement.(40) A corollary of this analysis is that formalising community does achieve the sustainability. It is organisations not purpose - probably for this reason that the evolution of civilisation brought into being formal state institutions on behalf of communities for provision of services through collective choice so that individuals could act as individuals and social and economic activity could take place without hindrance.
Hence it is rational to accept the informal and continually changing nature of the community organisations which exist even if not recognized. The epitome of modern state and society is that it provides for avenues where individuals are also given importance and state institutions are designed in a manner to remain responsive to them in the provision of services. Therefore, responsive state institutions have been preferred over community mobilisation in the developed countries. Reforms, capacity building and accountability have been chosen over mobilisation.
18. The RSP as an NGO
In case of an RSP the comparative advantage lies in mobilising resources in addition to public funds and without displacement of potential investments. This will serve the purpose of supplementing the state efforts and addressing the failure of formal service delivery. Its aims would thus be realised in its remaining an NGO and working at a distance from the government. The government's role remains in providing comprehensive and inclusive policy. This is a role, which unfortunately cannot be contracted out. Despite the weaknesses in state apparatus it will need to be performed by the public sector The reform in this area will aim at making the policy making participator~' without a substitution of one monopoly with another.
19. Policy lmplications
The discussion can be brought towards a close by identification of policy implications. Bawd on the earlier discussion the following are narrated:
a) The RSPs should function as NGOs and will be able to make an important contribution such a mode. The umbilical cord with the state should be severed.
b) The advantage of RSP lies in its functioning autonomously without substituting government efforts. Small is beautiful and so would be smaller NGOs working closely with beneficiaries without the necessity of replicating the government bureaucracy.
c) The RSPs and other NGOs should be used for delivery of micro-credit with the aim of rendering the market competitive. They can act as retailers of micro-credit. A wholesaler in the form of a provincial institution can be created to act as a funnel for the capital available in the formal financial institutions. This organisation can have the mandate of research on poverty to help the continual evolution of poverty eradication phonic responses.
d) The RSPs may not be taken as a monopolistic solution of participation in rural development. Nor should RSP approach be equated with the sole choice for involvement of NGOs in development,
e) The provision of public funds to NGOs should be on the basis of competitive processes This will enable a fair competition to come into play and emphasise efficiency and effectiveness in approaches and practices.
Spontaneously created CBOs and NGOs through their existence may he. highlighting the needs of the communities more effectively and require recognition 1w the stale for partnerships.(41)
The data on lack luster performance of government agencies may be used for focusing on reform and not avoiding it for preference of other options.
The Local government system with suitable electoral reform can provide responsive state institutions and become a vehicle for need based development. The elite domination can be solved through institutional mechanisms while informal community organisation can not provide the answer since community organisations are more susceptible to elite domination in a fractious polity. This can become immediately palpable if major fund flows exclusively start through community organisations instead of formal government mechanisms.
Local government systems working through secret ballot can provide an avenue for empowerment of people. It will however be a process which will take time. The informal community organisations and their federations in contrast even when linked with local governments over the long run can become stultified structures open to manipulation and interest group domination. The other and a rosier scenario can result in their dissolving into political parties, which vie for control of local governments as in any modern society but only after spending millions in the exercise of intervention.
The poverty reduction has to be a comprehensive, inclusive and resource conscious effort. RSP does not fit the mould. It focuses on a narrow area and its transplantation in all districts will cause resource displacement.
The requirement of community participation in certain projects can be met through RSPs and other NGOs. it needs to be a competitive process to bring in market efficiency and its attendant gains. No contracting organisations should be part of the project design exclusively and equal opportunity should be there for all NGOs. Such procurement of services should be through properly designed contracts.
The goven1merits support in the form of funds to RSPs should only be on the basis of independent evaluation and competitive processes. It may substitute anecdotal evidence. The reform of-the state institutions and- decentralisation are areas that require emphasis and would resolve the issues of unresponsiveness. The creation of RSPs will not attain the purpose since it will not address the issues causing unresponsiveness.
20. Conclusion
Hence it can be concluded that the RSPs have limited utility and that too in the NGO mode. With generating a need for enormous resources and by taking the social experience back to its pristine stage there will be misallocation of resources. On the contrary, the creation of local government system that ensures people's participation in decision-making and accountability will render the institutions responsive. The formation of organisations and their federations will be an exercise, which would be ignoring the historical context of local governments creation as a vehicle for empowerment -and responsive service delivery. At the same time the government needs to evolve a comprehensive policy for poverty eradication which spans over macro-economic initiatives and targeted programmes. it will also need to include governance reform to attain efficient and effective public sector delivery of services. The latter objective requires great effort but cannot be avoided. If a shepherd has the intractable problem of depletion of milk in the herd the solution might be tedious and' painstaking. It will certainly not get resolved through arranging a herbivorous dinosaur instead.
REFERENCES
1. PAP, 1999; 1; MCHD, 1999 a; pp. 10-Il.
2. Calculated from Government of NWFP, 1999 a; 248; Government of NWFP, 1999 h; 73
3. MSU, 1999;
4. NRSP, 1993; 4
5. The major RSPs are Sarhad Rural Support Corporation (established 1989), National Rural Support Programme (established in 1991), Balochistan Rural Support Programme (established in 1991). Punjab Rural Support Programme (established in 1998).
6. UNDP-SAPAP, 1998; 5
7. Fischer & Khan, 1998: 36 & 41
8. SRSC. 1999; Statistical L3riefs-Mansehra Region: SRSC, 1997; 12
9. 90 Novib. 1998; 26
10. Khan, 1998; 111
11. MVSP, 1993: Anuex-43; BADP, 1998; 143
12. cf. Fischer & Khan, 1998: 41 (Volume 11)
13. Planning Commission, 1999 a: 18: Clark, 1991; World Bank. 1998.
14. Salinity Control and Reclamation Project: against the requirement for forming 11 R8 water users associations during the original project duration of 1994-1998, only 304 could be made till June 1998 (Source~ Official records of Chief Agriculture, PE&DD).
15. BHUs: Basic Health Units are service delivery facilities for basic health services. The ongoing Social Action Programme Project-Il envisages involvement of beneficiaries in management of BHUs and Elementary Schools.
16. cf. Naseem, 2000: V
17. UNDP-SAPAP, 1998:
18. Russell, 1977; 88
19. Governance Unit, 2000: 17
20. World Bank, 1997; 110
21. MCHD, 1999b; 144
22. Development 23 NRSP, 1993; 29
23. Ahmad, 2000
24. Novib, 1998; 23; SRSC, 1998; 8
25. World Bank, 1999; 122
26. Todaro, 1997; 171
27. cf. Naqvi, 1999; V; Birdsall, 1995; 279
28. UNDP, 1998, 25; cf. Government of Pakist~in. 1999; 45-47
29. Lachi, 1999; 22
30. Pasha & Sabir, 1999; 16
31. Government of NWFP, 1999 C; JO
32. cr. Sen, 1995~ 22
33. State Bank of Pakistan. 1999; 50
34. Planning Commission, 1999 b; 6
35. SANMFI, 1998; 26
36. SRSC, 1998; pp. 26, 27. 29.32, 34; UNDP-SAPAP, 1998; pp. 22-25: NRSP, 1998: 23. 35.
37. World Bank, 1997; Part Three, to quote one of the many
38. Akhtar. 1999; 10
39. PRSP 1998, section vi; NRSP, 1998; 16
40. cf. Fischer & Khan. 1998: 15 (Volume 1)
41. cf. Siddiqui, 1998; 194
Index
Ahmad. S. (2000): 'Rural Development Programmes: Setting the Focus Right', The daily News International. Monday February 7, 2000.
Akbtar. S. (1999): 'Provincial Governments and the Budget Deficit' in Analysis of Provincial Budgets. 1999-2000, Social Policy and Development Centre, Karachi.
I3ADP (1998): Barani Area Development Project PC-I (Revised). PE&DD. Government of NWFP. Peshawar (Unpublished).
Birtsall. N. (1995): 'Population Growth' in Meier, G. (ed.): Issues in Economic Development. (5th Edition, Oxford University Press. New York.
Clark, 3. (1991); Democratizing Development: the Role of Voluntary Organizations, Kumarian Press, West Hartford, USA.
Fischer, K. & Khan. M. A. (1998); Cross-Sectional Study On Rural Development In NWFP.
Pakistan-Report Prepared on behalf of Deutsche Gessellsehaft Fur Technische Zusammenarbeit
(Unpublished)
Governance Unit (2000); Concept Paper on Essential Institutional Reforms Project-IJNI)P PA
PAKI97/OO6INEX, Governance Unit, Planning. Environment & Development - Department.
Government of NWFP. Peshawar (Unpublished).
Government of NWFP (1999) a; Demands for Grants, Current Expenditure for 1999-2000 (Miscellaneous), Volume III (Part-D), Finance. Excise & Taxation Department. Government of NWFP, Peshawar.
Government of NWFP (1999) b; Estimates of Receipts for 1999-2000, Volume II. Finance. Excise & Taxation Department. Government of NWFP, Peshawar.
Government of NWFP (1999) c; NWFP Development Statistics 1999, Bureau of Statistics. Planning. Environment & Development Department. Government of NWFP. Peshawar.
Government of Pakistan (1999); Economic Survey 1998-99, Economic Advisor's Wing. Finance Division. Government of Pakistan, Islamabad. -
Khan, M. Ii. (1998): Climbing the Development Ladder with NGO Support-Experiences of Rural People in Pakistan, Oxford University Press, Karachi.
Laclii (1999): Project Document for Lachi Poverty Reduction Project (Revised Draft), Lachi Poverty Reduction Project, Peshawar (Unpublished).
MCHD (1999) a: A Profile of Poverty in Pakistan, Mahbubul Haq Centre for Human Development in collaboration with UNDP. Islamabad.
MCHD (1999) h: Human Development in South Asia 1999-The Crisis of Governance, Mahhnhtil Ul Haq Centre for Human Development. Oxford University Press. Oxford.
MSU (1999): Social Action Programme-improving Quality of Services to the People. Multi-Donor Support Unit. Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
MVSP (1993): Mansehra Village Support Project PC-i, PE&DD. Government of NWFP, Peshawar (Unpublished).
Naqvi, M.B. (1999): 'Poverty Alleviation Alone Can Be ineffective'. The daily Dawn, Economic &Business Review. December 27, 1999.
Naseem. S.M. (2000): 'Are The Poor Being Taken For Another Ride'. The daily Dawn. Economic &Business Review. February 7-13. 2000.
Novib (1998): Sarhad Rural Support Corporation, NWFP. End of Phase Evaluation. SRS(.
Peshawar.
NRSP (1993): First Annual Report. National Rural Support Programme. Islamabad.
NRSP (1998): Fifth Annual Report 1997-98. National Rural Support Programme. Islamabad.
PAP (1999): Concept Paper on Poverty Alleviation Programme, Planning, Environment & Development Department. Government of NWFP. Peshawar (Unpublished).
Pasha. II. & Sahir , M (1999): 'The Buoyancy in Provincial Tax Revenues' in Analysis of Provincial Budgets. 1 999-2000. Social Policy and Development Centre. Karachi
Planning Commission (1999) a; Strategy for Governance. Planning Commission. Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
Lachi (1999): Project Document for Lachi Poverty Reduction Project (Revised Draft), Lachi Poverty Reduction Protect, Peshawar (Unpublished).
MCHD (1909) a: A Profile of Poverty in Pakistan, Mabbuhul Haq Centre for Human Development in collaboration with UNDP, Islarnabad.
MCHD (1999) b: Human Development in South Asia 1999-The Crisis of Governance, Mahbuhul Haq Centre for human Development. Oxford University Press. Oxford.
MSU (1999): Social Action Programme~-1rnproving Quality of Services to the People. Multi-Donor Support Unit. Government of Pakistan. Islarnabad.
MVSP (1993): Mansehra. Village Support Project PC-I, PF&DD. Government of NWFP. Peshawar (Unpublished).
Naqvi. MB. (1999): 'Poverty Alleviation Alone Can Be Ineffective'. The daily Dawn. Economic & Business Review. December 27. 1999.
Naseem, S.M. (2000): 'Are The Poor Being Taken For Another Ride'. The daily Dawn. Economic & Business Review. February 7-13. 2000.
Novib (1998): Sarhad Rural Support Corporation, NWFP. End of Phase Evaluation. SRS(. Peshawar.
NRSP (1993): First Annual Report. National Rural Support Programme. Islamabad,
NRSP (1998): Fifth Annual Report 1997-98. National Rural Support Programme. Islamabad.
PAP (1999): Concept Paper on Poverty Alleviation Programme, Planning. Environment & Development Department. Government of NWFP. Peshawar (U npi ihl ished).
Pasha. 11. & Sahir. M. (1 999): 'The Buoyancy in Provincial Tax Revenues' in Analysis of Provincial Budgets. 1999-2000. Social Policy and Development Centre. Karachi.
Planning Commission (1 999) a; Strategy for Governance. Planning Commission. Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
Planning Commission (1999) b: Human Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy. Planning Commission. Government of Pakistan. Islamabad.
PRSP (1998); Punjab Rural Support Programme. First Four Months. Punjab Rural Support Programme. Lahore.
Russell. B. (1977): 'The Harm that Good Men Do' in Skeptical Essays. George Allen & Unwin Publishers. London.
SANMFI (1998): Integrating Financial Markets-A Framework for increasing Micro Finance Outreach in Bangladesh. Discussion Paper. South Asian Network of Micro Finance Initiatives, Dhaka.
Sen, A. (1995); 'The Political Economy of Targeting' in De Walle. D. & Need. K.; Public Spending and the Poor: Theory and Evidence, World Bank, John Hopkins University Press Baltimore.
Siddiqui, R (1998) 'Sangeetha Purshothaman; The Empowerment of Women in India- Grassroots Women's Network and the State' in Pakistan Development Review. Vol 37. No. 2. 1998. pp 193-197.
SRSC (1997): Annual Review 1997. Sarhad Rural Support Corporation. Peshawar.
SRSC (1998): SRSC Harnessing People's Potential-Mini Review. .January to .June 1998, Sarhad Rural Support Corporation. Peshawar.
SRSC (1999): Working Papers for the 28"' BoD Meeting, PF&DD, Peshawar (Unpublished). State Bank of Pakistan (1999): Annual Report 1998-99. State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi.
Tordaro, M. (1997); Economic Development, Sixth Edition. Addison Wesley Longman Limited Hartford. England.
UNDP (1998): human Development Report 1998. Oxford University Press. New York.
UNDP-SAPAP (1 998): South Asia Poverty Alleviation Program-Progress Report 1 997-98. IJNDP-SAPAP. Peshawar.
World Bank (1997): World Development Report 1997- the State in a Changing World, Oxford University Press. New York.
World Bank (1998): NGOs in Bank Supported Projects: and Operations Evaluation Department Review. World Bank. Washington DC.
World Bank (1999): World Development Report 1999-2000, Entering the 21st Century. Oxford University Press. Oxford.
End.